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Abstract
This paper quantitatively investigates the optimal capital income taxation in the general
equilibrium overlapping generations model, which incorporates characteristics of housing
and the U.S. preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing. Housing tax policy is
found to have a substantial eect on how capital income should be taxed. Given the U.S.
preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing, the optimal capital income tax rate
is close to zero, contrary to the high optimal capital income tax rate implied by models
without housing. A lower capital income tax rate implies a narrowed tax wedge between
housing and non-housing capital, which indirectly nullies the subsidies (taxes) for home-
owners (renters) and corrects the over-investment to housing.
JEL Classi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11 Introduction
Whether the government should tax capital income in the long run has been an important
question and one that has been answered under variety of assumptions. Chamley (1986) and
Judd (1985) argue that the government should not tax capital income, using a model with an
innitely lived representative agent.1 On the other hand, the optimal capital income tax rate is
known to be dierent from zero in overlapping generations models. Erosa and Gervais (2002)
and Garriga (2003) theoretically show that the optimal capital income tax rate is not zero.
Moreover, a recent study by Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) shows quantitatively that the
optimal capital income tax rate is not only non-zero but very large, using a calibrated overlapping
generations model. What is missing in the discussion on the optimal capital income taxation
is housing, which consists of 40% of the total capital of the U.S. economy and is the biggest
single asset for the majority of U.S. households. Not only is housing large, but it is also dierent
from non-housing capital and taxed very dierently. The purpose of the paper is to revisit
the optimality of the capital income taxation, taking into account the unique characteristics of
housing and housing tax policy.
How is housing dierent from non-housing capital? Notable dierences are: (i) housing is held
for the dual purpose of consumption and savings, (ii) housing can be either owned or rented, (iii)
if owned, housing can be used as collateral for mortgage loans, and (iv) income from housing is
taxed dierently from non-housing capital income. In particular, in the U.S. there are two policies
that favor housing, especially owner-occupied housing. First, imputed rents on owner-occupied
housing are tax exempt. Second, the mortgage interest payment can be deducted from taxable
income up to a certain limit. There are studies that investigate the implications of such housing
tax policy, but mostly without a quantitative macroeconomic model. This paper is intended to
bridge the gap between the literature on macroeconomic public nance, which typically ignores
housing capital, and that on housing policy, where the quantitative general equilibrium model is
rarely used.
In the U.S. and many other countries, owner-occupied housing enjoys various forms of implicit
and explicit subsidies that non-housing capital does not enjoy. Rosen (1985) argues that it is
dicult to justify the U.S. housing policy from an eciency or a redistribution point of view and
concludes that \paternalism and political considerations seem to be the source of this policy."2
Consistent with his argument, Gervais (2002) nds a substantial welfare gain from eliminating
the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing. The current paper will not provide
a positive theory of housing taxation. Instead, housing tax policy is taken as given, and the
optimal capital income taxation conditional on dierent housing policies is explored.
I employ the Ramsey approach to the optimal taxation problem. In this approach, the size
of government expenditures in every period is exogenously given, a set of available distortionary
tax instruments is assumed, and the optimal tax system within the set is explored. For the
1It is further shown that the result holds true in less restrictive environments. Chari and Kehoe (1999) oer
a good survey of the optimal taxation results within the Ramsey framework. Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999)
show that the optimality of a zero capital income tax rate holds even if some assumptions are relaxed.
2I will not explore the implications of so-called behavioral assumptions here. For example, support for housing
could be justied if consumers' preference exhibits hyperbolic discounting, and housing is useful as a commitment
device to avoid over-consumption. See Laibson (1996) for this line of argument.
2baseline experiment, I assume (i) the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing that
is present in the U.S., (ii) progressive labor income taxation, with the progressivity mimicking
that of the U.S. federal income tax, and (iii) proportional capital income taxation. Under these
assumptions, the optimal level of the capital income tax rate is investigated while maintaining
revenue neutrality. The assumption of the proportionality of the capital income tax is due to
the computational feasibility, but Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) nd that the optimal tax
system does not include progressive capital income tax in their model without housing.
There are three main ndings. First, the optimal capital income tax rate is close to zero
even in the life-cycle model, given the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing. In
the baseline experiment, the optimal capital income tax rate is found to be 1%. This is very
dierent from 31%, which is obtained in the standard model without housing. The intuition
is simple. When the imputed rents on owner-occupied housing are tax-exempt by assumption,
lowering the capital income tax rate is equivalent to narrowing the tax wedge between housing
and non-housing capital. There are two consequences. First, the narrowed tax wedge nullies the
subsidies to homeowners, who are typically higher earners, and taxes to renters, who are typically
lower earners. Second, the narrowed tax wedge corrects the over-investment in housing capital.
The numerical result shows that this simple intuition is actually very important in shaping the
optimal capital income taxation. Second, when the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied
housing is eliminated, it becomes optimal to tax capital at a high rate again, as in the standard
model without housing. In the baseline experiment, the optimal capital income tax rate is found
to be 24%. When the tax wedge is eliminated by assumption, lowering the capital income tax
rate no longer works to nullify the preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. The
two results above taken together suggest that housing tax/subsidy policy has a substantial eect
on how capital income should be taxed. In other words, taxation of housing and non-housing
capital should be considered as a package, because of the tight interaction between the two.
Third, in either of the two cases discussed above, the welfare gain from moving from the baseline
economy to the one with the optimal capital income tax rate is sizable: 1.2% of additional per-
period consumption when the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing is preserved,
and 1.6% when the preferential tax treatment is eliminated. Consequently, implementing a high
capital income tax rate, which is optimal in the model without housing, in the model with housing
incurs a severe welfare loss.
This paper is most closely related to Gervais (2002) and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009).
However, there are three key dierences. First, my focus is the capital income tax rate, while
Gervais (2002) focuses on the welfare gain of eliminating preferential tax treatment of owner-
occupied housing. Second, there is no labor-leisure decision in the Gervais (2002) model. As will
be shown in a robustness analysis in Section 9, a labor-leisure decision plays a substantial role
in shaping the main results of the paper. Finally, there is no intra-generational heterogeneity in
the Gervais (2002) model. The paper can also be interpreted as revisiting the results of Conesa,
Kitao, and Krueger (2009), using a model with housing. One main result of the current paper {
that the optimal capital income tax rate is close to zero in the model with housing { exhibits a
strong contrast to their main result { that the optimal capital income tax rate is very large.
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 sets up the model and Section 4 describes how the model is calibrated.
3Some of the details of calibration are found in Appendix A.1 and A.2. The model is solved
numerically. Section 5 gives an overview of the solution methods. Appendix A.3 gives further
details of the computational methods. The properties of the baseline model economy with
housing are studied in Section 6. In Section 7, the methodology for counterfactual experiments
is explained. Appendix A.4 provides some details about the welfare criteria used here. Section 8
presents the main results of the paper. A variety of robustness analyses is oered in Section 9.
Section 10 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The list of the related literature starts with Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), who show that the
optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run in the standard growth model. A positive
capital income tax discourages saving. Moreover, capital income tax implies dierent tax rates for
consumption goods at dierent points of time in the future with an increasing degree of distortion
over time, implying a severe violation of the uniform taxation principle. The crucial assumption
for this celebrated result is that the economy is inhabited by an innitely lived representative
agent. There is no ex-ante heterogeneity within or across cohorts, and complete markets wipe
away any ex-post heterogeneity. If the economy is populated by nitely lived agents, if there is
an ex-ante heterogeneity, or if markets are incomplete, a zero capital income tax rate might not
be optimal.
Aiyagari (1995) argues that, in the presence of market incompleteness, the optimal capital
income tax is not zero in the long run. In the economy with uninsured idiosyncratic shocks to
earnings, agents have a precautionary savings motive, which pushes the aggregate savings above
the ecient level in the complete markets model. A positive capital income tax can x the
over-accumulation of assets by countering the incentive to hold precautionary savings. Domeij
and Heathcote (2004) build on the model used by Aiyagari (1995) and investigate the optimal
capital income taxation in the model, which features a realistic degree of the wealth inequality
due to market incompleteness. They nd that, taking into account the welfare loss during the
transition, implementing a zero capital income tax generates a welfare loss. According to their
baseline experiment, the optimal capital income tax rate is 39.7%. However, the long-run optimal
capital income tax rate without consideration of the cost of transition is still zero.
On the other hand, in overlapping generations models populated with nitely lived agents,
Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Garriga (2003) theoretically show that the optimal capital income
tax rate is not zero in general. The key intuition is that marginal utility with respect to both
consumption and leisure changes over the life-cycle. Consequently, the optimal taxation must
include age-dependent tax rates. If the age-dependent tax is not available (in their case, by
assumption), welfare loss due to capital income tax could be less severe than excessively taxing
the most productive agents.
Moreover, recent work by Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) shows that the optimal capital
income tax rate is not only zero but very large and positive in the calibrated overlapping gener-
ations model. The result holds even if the markets are complete, or if the progressivity of labor
income tax provides a substantial degree of redistribution or insurance. In their baseline model
with life-cycle individual productivity proles and uninsured idiosyncratic productivity shocks,
they nd that the optimal capital tax rate is as high as 36%. The life-cycle savings motive
4(saving for retirement) makes saving less elastic to changes in the after-tax rate of return on
capital, which makes the eciency loss associated with capital income taxation smaller and the
eciency loss from taxing labor income relatively larger. Fuster, _ Imrohoro glu, and _ Imrohoro glu
(2008) study how the strength of altruism aects the welfare gain from various tax reforms. The
result by Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) is the reference point for the current paper. In
particular, the one-asset model developed in this paper is basically the same as the model in
Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009). I will argue that, by explicitly considering the dierence
between housing and nancial assets, the optimal capital income tax rate drastically changes.
Regarding housing taxation, a long list of studies argue the optimality of taxing imputed rents
of owner-occupied housing and eliminating the mortgage interest payment deduction. Rosen
(1985) oers a good summary of the literature analyzing the eects of the government's policy
toward housing. However, analysis of housing taxation in a realistically calibrated general equi-
librium model started to appear only recently. The pioneer work is Gervais (2002). He analyzes
such welfare gains using the calibrated overlapping generations model. D az and Luengo-Prado
(2008) study the eect of the preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing on homeown-
ership. The current paper is related to the literature on housing taxation because the welfare
gain from implementing the optimal capital income taxation turns out to be closely related to
the welfare gain from eliminating ineciency associated with the preferential tax treatment of
owner-occupied housing.
To the best of my knowledge, Eerola and Maattanen (2009) are the only ones who study the
optimal capital and housing taxation in a macroeconomic model. In particular, they investigate
optimal housing taxation in the standard growth model with housing and non-housing capital.
Using the standard Ramsey approach, they nd that it is optimal to tax housing and non-housing
capital at the same rate; it is inecient to create a wedge between these two kinds of capital. It
implies that, in the long-run, where it is optimal to have zero capital income tax, it is also optimal
not to tax housing. This is an extension of the standard Chamley-Judd result. The current paper
is related to their work in the sense that both papers investigate taxation of housing and non-
housing capital in a unied framework. However, the dierences are substantial; the current
paper features (i) a tenure decision between owning and renting, (ii) realistic mortgage markets,
(iii) market incompleteness and resulting realistic income and asset distribution, (iv) life-cycle,
and (v) quantitative results of the carefully calibrated model. The life-cycle aspect is especially
important because Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) nd that, in the model that features the
life-cycle, it is optimal to heavily tax non-housing capital.
The model used in the current paper is built on the literature that develops general equilibrium
models with uninsured idiosyncratic shocks. The pioneer papers are Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett
(1996). The papers that introduce housing or durable assets into the standard general equilibrium
framework with uninsured idiosyncratic uncertainty are Gervais (2002), Fern andez-Villaverde and
Krueger (2005), D az and Luengo-Prado (2010), and Nakajima (2005). Chambers, Garriga, and
Schlagenhauf (2009a) use the general equilibrium model with housing to investigate the recent
rise in the homeownership rate.
53 Model
The model is based on the general equilibrium overlapping generations model with uninsured
idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity and mortality, in particular Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger
(2009). The novel feature of the model is that there are both housing and nancial assets. The
following four key characteristics of housing assets are explicitly incorporated into the model.
First, housing assets play a dual role; housing generates services consumed by those who live
in it and, at the same time, is a means for saving. Second, housing can be owned or rented.
Third, homeowners can use their housing as collateral for mortgage loans. Using mortgage loans,
agents can live in a house whose value is larger than the value of their total wealth. Fourth,
there is a preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing through the tax-exemption of
imputed rents and the mortgage interest payment deduction. Since the government can tax
owner-occupied and rented housing and nancial assets dierently, the model can naturally be
used to understand how the dierence in taxes for housing, either owned or rented, and nancial
assets aects allocations, prices, and welfare.
3.1 Demographics
Time is discrete. In each period, the economy is populated by I overlapping generations of
agents. In period t, a measure (1 + 
)t of agents is born. 
 is the population growth rate. Each
generation is populated by a mass of agents, each of whom is measure zero. Agents are born at
age 1 and could live up to age I. There is a probability of early death. Specically, i is the
probability with which an age-i agent survives to age i + 1. With probability (1   i), an age-i
agent does not survive to age i + 1. I is the maximum possible age, which implies I = 0.
Agents retire at age 1 < IR < I. Agents with age i  IR are called workers, and those with
age i > IR are called retirees. IR is a parameter, implying that retirement is mandatory.
3.2 Preference
An agent maximizes its expected lifetime utility. The utility function of an agent takes the






where ci is the consumption of non-housing goods at age i, di is the consumption of housing
services at age i, and mi is the leisure enjoyed at age i. E is the expectation operator with
respect to the information at the time of birth.  is the time discount factor. u(:;:;:) is strictly
increasing and strictly concave in all three arguments.
3.3 Endowment
Agents are endowed with one unit of time in each period and housing asset h1 and nancial asset
a1 at birth. I assume that h1 = 0 and a1 = 0. Agents can use their time either for work ` or for
leisure m. Formally:
1 = `i + mi (2)
for each age i.
6Agents are heterogeneous in terms of labor productivity. Labor productivity has two compo-
nents, ei and e. ei is a component associated with age or working experience of agents. Since
agents are forced to retire at age IR, ei = 0 for i > IR. e is the stochastic component and
independent of the age of agents. Each newborn draws the initial e 2 E = fe1;e2;:::;eneg from
fp0
eg, where each of p0
e represents the probability assigned to each possible realization of e. The
stochastic process for e is identical for all agents and independent across agents. In particular,
log(e) is assumed to follow a nite-state rst-order Markov process (E;fpee0g), where pee0 repre-
sents the Markov transition probability from e to e0. For an agent who supplies `i hours of work,
the product `ieie represents the individual labor supply of an age-i agent, measured in eciency
units.
3.4 Technology
There is a representative rm that has access to the following constant returns to scale technology:
Yt = ZtF(Kt;Lt) (3)
where Yt is output, Zt is the level of total factor productivity, Kt is aggregate non-housing capital
input, and Lt is aggregate labor input measured in eciency units in period t, respectively.
Because of Euler's theorem, if the inputs are traded in competitive markets, the rm's prot will
be zero in equilibrium. Non-housing capital depreciates at a constant rate K. Housing capital is
denoted by Ht and depreciates at a constant rate H. There is a linear technology that converts
between one unit of housing capital and one unit of non-housing capital costlessly. In sum, the
aggregate resource constraint of the economy is the following:
Ct + Gt + Kt+1 + Ht+1 = (1   H)Ht + (1   K)Kt + Yt (4)
where Ct is total private consumption, and Gt is public consumption. Gt is not valued by agents.
Housing capital Ht yields housing services Dt. Without loss of generality, the following linear
production function is assumed:
Ht = Dt (5)
Because of the structure of the transformation technology, I can use Ht and Dt interchangeably.
3.5 Real Estate Sector
The real estate sector works as the intermediary for agents who rent housing.3 In each period,
a real estate rm borrows nancial assets from saving agents and uses the assets to buy housing
assets. The housing assets are rented out to renters, and the real estate rm receives the rent
qt, and uses it to pay back the cost of debt together with other costs. The following equation
species the problem of a real estate rm in period t:
max
ht
f(1   H)ht + qtht   (1 + rt)ht   P;thtg (6)
3The setup of the real estate sector is the same as in Nakajima (2005). Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf
(2009b) construct a model in which homeowners can become landlords and supply rental properties to renters.
7where (1   H)ht is the value of the house after depreciation, qtht is the rental income of the
real estate rm, (1 + rt)ht is the nancial cost associated with the housing assets, and P;t is
the property tax rate. Assuming free entry to the real estate sector, the equilibrium rent is
determined by the zero prot condition and takes the following form:
qt = rt + P;t + H (7)
Basically, renters pay for the nancial cost of the value of housing that they rent plus the property
tax and the maintenance cost (depreciation) for the rented housing, through the real estate sector,
which is acting as the intermediary.
3.6 Market Structure
First, without loss of generality, I assume that agents own nancial assets instead of non-housing
capital. One unit of nancial assets is a claim to one unit of non-housing capital. In addition,
nancial assets capture mortgage loans as well. In particular, a positive amount of nancial
assets is a claim to the same amount of non-housing capital, while a negative amount of nancial
assets denotes mortgage debt of the absolute value of the nancial asset position. The use of
nancial assets helps to ease the notation by combining non-housing capital and mortgage loans.
In the same manner, I use the terms housing assets and housing capital interchangeably. Housing
assets can be either owned or rented from the real estate sector.
Labor and nancial assets are traded in competitive markets. By assumption, agents cannot
trade state-contingent securities to insure away the shocks with respect to labor productivity or
mortality. However, agents can save in the form of housing and nancial assets and self-insure.
As for the housing assets, agents can either own or rent housing assets but the choice is
exclusive. When renting, an agent pays the unit cost of housing, which is the rental cost qt to a
real estate rm. When owning, an agent has to pay both a property tax and a depreciation. The
interpretation of the depreciation is the maintenance cost. There is a minimum size constraint
of housing assets. Moreover, the minimum size is dierent depending on the tenure: h
r for
rental properties and h
o for owner-occupied housings. This is a parsimonious way to capture the
lumpiness of housing, and this assumption was originally used by Gervais (2002).
The assumption of dierent minimum sizes deserves some discussion. Think of an model
without the minimum size restrictions. Because of the preferential tax treatment for the owner-
occupied housing, agents in the model choose to own housing rather than renting as long as it
is feasible. On the other hand, the homeownership rate in the U.S. is only around 64$, except
for the recent period. This implies that there are some additional costs of owning, which makes
about one-third of households in the U.S. renting rather than owning. Assuming minimum
size restrictions is one parsimonious way to achieve the relatively low homeownership rate. It is
important to point out, however, that the main results of the paper is robust to other assumptions,
such as higher moving costs pertaining to ownership and additional costs of owning.
When owning, an agent can use the value of housing assets as collateral. In particular, an
agent can borrow up to (1 ) of the value of housing assets that the agent owns. Collateralized
borrowing is called a mortgage loan. Mortgage loans in the model capture both primary mortgage
loans and other types of loans that are secured by the value of housing. There is no unsecured
loan. If interpreted as the standard primary mortgage loan, h is the down payment to own
8housing of value h. If interpreted as a secondary mortgage loan, a home equity loan, or a home
equity line of credit, (1   )h is the maximum value of mortgages an agent can take out from
the housing asset of value h.
Housing services cannot be traded. Since marginal utility from housing services is assumed
to be strictly positive, the assumption implies that, regardless of the tenure status, an agent
consumes all the housing services generated by the housing asset that it is owning or renting.
3.7 Government Policy
The government is engaged in the following three activities: (i) collecting various forms of taxes
to nance the public expenditure each period Gt, (ii) collecting estate taxes and distributing
them to all surviving agents in a lump sum, and (iii) running the pay-as-you-go social security
program.
The government must spend Gt in period t. fGtg1
t=0 is exogenously given. It is the standard
setup in the optimal taxation problem. For simplicity, I assume that the government must
balance the budget each period. In other words, the government must collect taxes whose total
amount is Gt in every period t. There are ve types of taxes: (i) proportional capital income tax
with the tax rate K;t; (ii) labor income tax represented by the tax function Tt(:), which captures
the progressivity of the U.S. tax code; (iii) property tax with the tax rate P;t; (iv) proportional
tax for the imputed rents of owner-occupied housing, with the tax rate H;t; and (v) proportional
subsidy (negative tax) for mortgage interest payment with the tax rate M;t. This captures the
mortgage interest payment deduction.
Since time of death is stochastic, and there is no private annuity market, there are accidental
bequests. The government imposes a 100% estate tax rate on accidental bequests and distributes
all the proceeds equally to all the surviving agents using a lump-sum transfer, in each period. tt
denotes the lump-sum transfer for each agent in period t.
Finally, the government runs a simple social security program. The government collects payroll
taxes from labor income at the rate S;t. All the proceeds are equally distributed to all the retired
agents in each period. The social security benet is denoted by bi;t, where bi;t = 0 for i  IR, and
bi;t = bt for all i > IR. Notice that, since the amount of benet is the same for all agents regardless
of the amount contributed, this particular social security program has a strong redistribution
eect, as does the U.S. Social Security program.
3.8 Agents' Problem
The agents' problem is formulated recursively. I use a prime to denote a variable in the next
period. An agent is characterized by the set of individual state variables (i;e;x), where i is
age, e is the stochastic component of individual productivity, and x is total wealth. The use of
total wealth x instead of a pair of housing and nancial assets (h;a) as a state variable reduces
the size of the state space and thus greatly simplies the problem. But the transformation
becomes invalid if there is a xed cost of changing housing or nancial asset holdings, and thus
it is necessary to keep track of the portfolio allocation determined in the previous period. The





















x + tt = h
o + a (10)
(1 + e rt)a + (1   H   P;t   rtH;t)h




rt(1   K;t) if a  0
rt(1   M;t) if a < 0 (12)
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(1 + e rt)(x + tt) + wteei`(1   S;t)   Tt(wteei`) + bi;t = c + x
0 + qth
r (14)
e rt = rt(1   K;t) (15)
Equation (8) represents the tenure decision. V o
t (i;e;x) and V r
t (i;e;x) are the values condi-
tional on owning and renting, respectively. The two Bellman equations that follow dene the
values conditional on the tenure choice.
The Bellman equation (9) is the problem of a homeowner. A homeowner chooses consumption
c, nancial assets a (which captures savings by a positive value and mortgage loans by a negative
value), owned housing assets ho, wealth carried over to the next period x0, and hours worked `
to maximize the sum of the current utility and the expected discounted value in the next period,
subject to the constrains listed above and explained below.
The rst constraint (10) is the asset allocation constraint. The sum of the total wealth x and
the lump-sum transfer tt is allocated to housing assets ho and nancial assets a. Notice that
the agent can borrow up to (1   )ho using mortgage loans collateralized by the value of owned
housing assets ho. In the case in which an agent is using mortgage loans, the size of housing h
will be larger than total wealth. House size h is subject to the minimum size restriction h  h
o.
The second constraint (11) is the budget constraint. The rst term on the left-hand side is
the principal and after-tax interest income of nancial assets. More explanation of the after-tax
interest income is found below. The second term represents the value of owned housing assets
after paying the property tax, the owner-occupied housing tax and the maintenance cost. The
housing tax is represented as the proportion of the interest rate (rtH;t), which makes it easier to
compare the cost of renting and owning. The third term is labor income net of the social security
tax. wteei` is the before-tax labor income. S;t is the social security tax rate. The fourth term
is the labor income tax, which is characterized by the tax function Tt(:). The last term on the
left hand side is the social security benet bi;t. As bi;t = 0 for i  IR, the social security benet
10is zero for working agents. The right-hand side consists of non-housing consumption c and total
wealth carried over to the next period x0.
Equation (12) denes the after-tax interest rate. When the agent is saving (a  0), the saving
yields the before-tax return of rt but is subject to the proportional capital income tax at the rate
of K;t. When the agent is borrowing (a < 0), the agent pays the interest rate for the amount of
the mortgage loans, but there is a tax deduction whose amount is dened as the proportion M;t
of mortgage interest payments.
The Bellman equation (13) is the problem of a renter. A renter chooses hr instead of ho, and
hr is bounded from below by h
r. A renter does not make an asset allocation decision because all
the wealth is invested into nancial assets by denition of a renter. (14) is the budget constraint
for a renter. There is no term for the owner-occupied housing asset and there is a cost of rental
properties qthr on the right-hand side. The nancial asset a for a homeowner corresponds to
(x + tt) for the renter, since renters have only nancial assets (ho = 0). The after-tax interest
rate e rt is always the interest rate net of the capital income tax rate K;t because renters cannot
borrow using mortgage loans, by denition.
The solution to the dynamic programming problem above yields optimal decision rules c =
gc;t(i;e;x), ho = go;t(i;e;x), hr = gr;t(i;e;x), a = ga;t(i;e;x), ` = g`;t(i;e;x), and x0 = gx;t(i;e;x).
The tenure decision is included in ho = go;t(i;e;x) and hr = gr;t(i;e;x). In particular, if an agent
is an owner, hr = gr;t(i;e;x) = 0. The opposite holds if an agent is a renter.
3.9 Equilibrium
I dene the recursive competitive equilibrium and the stationary recursive competitive equilib-
rium of the economy. In the latter, prices are constant over time. The population size is growing
at the constant rate 
, but the age composition of the population is time invariant.
Let M = f1;2;:::;Ig  E  X, where x 2 X  R+. X is assumed to be compact. The upper
bound is set such that it is never binding and thus the solution to the problem with the bound
is the same as the one without. The lower bound of X is zero. M is the space of individual
states. Let m 2 M be an element of M. Let M be the Borel -algebra generated by M, and let
 the probability measure dened over M. I will use a probability space (M;M;) to represent
a type distribution of agents.
Denition 1 (Recursive competitive equilibrium) Given sequences of government expen-
ditures fGtg1
t=0, social security tax rates fS;tg1
t=0, total factor productivity fZtg1
t=0, and ini-
tial conditions K0, H0, 0, a recursive competitive equilibrium is a sequence of value func-
tions fVt(i;e;x)g1








t=0, aggregate stock of housing








t=0, tax policies fK;t;Tt(:);P;t;H;t;M;tg1











t=0, are the associated
optimal decision rules.
112. The representative rm maximizes its prot. Equivalently, rt and wt satisfy the following
marginal conditions for all t:
rt = ZtFK(Kt;Lt)   K (16)
wt = ZtFL(Kt;Lt) (17)
3. The real estate sector is competitive. Consequently, rent is determined as follows:
qt = rt + P;t + H (18)














t=0 is consistent with the transition function Qt(m;M), which is consistent with the










Tt(eiewtg`;t(i;e;x)) + max(ga;t(i;e;x);0)rtK;t + min(ga;t(i;e;x);0)rtM;t
+ go;t(i;e;x)rtH;t + (go;t(i;e;x) + gr;t(i;e;x))P;t dt
7. The total amount of accidental bequests is equal to the total amount of lump-sum transfers.








(1   i)gx;t(i;e;x) dt (23)
8. Budget balance regarding the social security program. In particular, the following budget







12Denition 2 (Stationary recursive competitive equilibrium) A stationary recursive com-
petitive equilibrium is a recursive competitive equilibrium where tax policies, total factor produc-
tivity, value functions, optimal decision rules, prices, transfers, and social security benets are
time invariant. Government expenditures and aggregate variables are growing at the constant
rate 
 and thus time are invariant if normalized by the population size.
Notice that the market clearing condition for non-housing capital stock includes  gr;t(i;e;x).
This is because real estate rms borrow exactly the same amount of housing assets as they rent.
The market clearing condition for the housing capital stock includes owner-occupied housing
assets and the amount of housing assets rented. The ve terms in the integrand in the government
budget constraint denote labor income taxes, capital income taxes, mortgage interest payment
deduction, owner-occupied housing taxes, and property taxes, respectively.
Since I focus on the stationary equilibrium, I drop the time subscripts hereafter.
4 Calibration
I will rst describe how the baseline model economy with both housing and nancial assets is
calibrated. In the last section, I will discuss how the version of the model economy with only
nancial assets is calibrated and compare the two economies.
4.1 Demographics
One period is set as one year in the model. Age 1 in the model corresponds to the actual age of
22. I is set at 79, meaning that the maximum actual age is 100. IR is set at 43, implying that
the agents start life in retirement at the actual age of 65. The annual population growth rate,

, is set at 1:2%. This growth rate corresponds to the average annual population growth rate of
the U.S. over the last 50 years. The survival probabilities figI
i=1 are taken from the life table in
Social Security Administration (2007).4 Figure 6 in Appendix A.1 shows the conditional survival
probabilities used.
4.2 Preference





A Cobb-Douglas aggregator between (composite-)consumption goods and leisure is standard
in the literature and is used by Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) as well. A Cobb-Douglas
aggregator between non-housing consumption goods and housing services is a special form of
a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) aggregator with unit elasticity. The assumption of
unit elasticity between housing and non-housing goods is also used by Fern andez-Villaverde and
Krueger (2005). They refer to empirical studies estimating the elasticity and claim that the unit
elasticity is in the middle of various estimates.
  is calibrated later to match the relative size of the housing and non-housing capital stock
in equilibrium.  is pinned down such that average hours worked are 0:33 of the disposable time
4Table 4.C6 of Social Security Administration (2007). The survival probability of males conditional on age is
used.
13for workers in equilibrium.  is pinned down such that the coecient of relative risk aversion
associated with the composite goods of housing services and non-housing consumption goods
is 2:0. This is a commonly used value in the literature.5 The other parameter for preference,
, will be calibrated such that the aggregate amount of wealth in the model matches the U.S.
counterpart.








Leisure m is separable from consumption of aggregated goods, and consumption of non-housing
goods c and housing services d is non-separable and aggregated with a Cobb-Douglas aggregator.
, which represents the coecient of relative risk aversion, is set at 2:0.  is set at 3, which
corresponds to the Frisch elasticity of 0.5. This value is consistent with various estimates using
micro data. Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) also use  = 3:0.
4.3 Endowment
The average life-cycle prole of earnings feigI
i=1 is taken from Hansen (1993). Since Hansen
(1993) estimates labor productivity for groups consisting of ve ages (for example, ages 20-24,
25-29,...), his estimates are smoothed out using a quadratic function. Figure 7 in Appendix A.1
shows the life-cycle prole of the average labor productivity used in the model. Since mandatory
retirement at the model age of IR, ei = 0 for i > IR.
As for the stochastic component of agents' earnings, I use the data on the cross-sectional
variances of log of the hourly wage of the heads of households in the Panel Study on Income
Dynamics (PSID). According to the PSID data, the cross-sectional variance of log of the hourly
wage of heads of household of age 22 is 0.197, and the same statistic for heads of household
of age 64 is 0.674, and the cross-sectional variance is almost linearly increasing. Appendix A.2
includes details about the empirical procedure. I basically follow the methodology of Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2004) but derive the cross-sectional variances of hourly wages of the heads
of households over the life-cycle, instead of those of the total earnings of households.
In the model, I assume that the initial distribution of loge is the normal N(0;2
e) and loge
follows the following AR(1) process:
loge
0 = e loge +  (27)
with   N(0;2
). There are three parameters, e, e and , that characterize the stochastic
process. These three parameters are pinned down to capture the properties of the PSID data
described above. First, 2
e is set at 0:197 so that the cross-sectional variance of loge for agents
of age 1 (corresponding to the actual age of 22) in the model is equal to the cross-sectional
variance of log of the hourly wage of age-22 households. Second, in the data, cross-sectional
variance almost linearly increases. It means that the persistence parameter e must be close to
unity for the stochastic process of the model to replicate the property. Therefore, e is set at
5Specically,  is set to satisfy 1   CRRA = (1   ), where CRRA is the coecient of relative risk aversion
and is set at 2:0.
140:99. Finally,  is chosen such that the stochastic process used in the model implies that the
cross-sectional variance of loge for age-43 agents (corresponding to the actual age of 64) is 0:674.
This procedure leads to 2
 = 0:02058.
Finally, the AR(1) process is approximated using a nite-state rst-order Markov process.
I use ne = 9 as the number of states. For a highly persistent process, it is dicult for the
discretized stochastic process to replicate the original process with a small number of ne. The
AR(1) process obtained above is converted into the Markov process using the method proposed
by Tauchen (1986). In the standard Tauchen (1986) method, abscissas are distributed with equal
space between  e and e, where the scale parameter  is set at 2 and e is the unconditional
standard deviation of e. Instead of the standard method with  = 2, I calibrate  so that the
discretized stochastic process generates the same variance as the original process for age-43 agents
(corresponding to the actual age of 64). This procedure yields  = 1:5. The initial distribution
of loge is approximated by assigning the probabilities to each of the grids obtained by applying
the Tauchen (1986) method, similar to the way used in Tauchen (1986) for Markov process.
4.4 Technology




with  = 0:247 computed using the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). The value
of  is lower than the value usually used in the literature. This is because, in the current model,
a part of the widely dened capital income associated with housing capital is removed from the
denition of capital income for this economy with two kinds of capital.6 I also calibrate the
model with only non-housing capital and nancial assets. I recalibrate  such that there is no
distinction between housing and non-housing capital and obtain  = 0:326, which is consistent
with the commonly used value for one-asset models. The depreciation rate for non-housing capital
is K = 0:109. The depreciation rate for housing capital is H = 0:017. Both are computed using
the data on depreciation in NIPA. Since there is no shock to total factor productivity, Z works
as a scaling parameter. I normalize at Z = 1.
4.5 Housing Market
There are three parameters pertaining to the housing market: the down payment requirement
ratio , and the minimum sizes of owned and rented properties, h
o and h
r. I set  = 0:20.
This is consistent with the typical down payment ratio of primary mortgage loans (20%) or a
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 80%. As for the minimum size restrictions, I set h
r = 0. I calibrate
h
o such that the model generates the homeownership rate in the recent U.S. economy. Except for
very recent years, the homeownership rate stayed around 64% in the U.S. This number is chosen
as the calibration target. Notice that, without the strictly positive minimum restriction h
o, the
homeownership rate in the model will be substantially higher than the observed rate because of
the preferential tax treatment of homeownership.
6D az and Luengo-Prado (2010) follow the same calibration strategy and obtain a similarly low  of 0.26.
154.6 Government Policy
Following Domeij and Heathcote (2004), who use proportional taxes for capital and labor income,
I use K = 40% for the baseline capital income tax rate.7 As for housing taxes, since the imputed
rents of owner-occupied housing in the U.S. are not taxed, I set H = 0% for the baseline rate.
The baseline rate for the mortgage interest payment deduction is set at 23%. This number is the
average marginal subsidy associated with mortgage interest payments, computed by Feenberg
and Poterba (2004).
In order for the baseline model economy to capture key features of the current U.S. tax system,
it is crucial to capture the progressivity of the federal income tax rate. I use the results of Gouveia
and Strauss (1994), who estimate the progressive tax schedule of the U.S. federal income tax
between 1979 and 1989, using the following functional form:
T(y) = 0(y   (y
 1 + 2)
 1=1) (29)
where y is taxable income and T(y) is the corresponding tax bill. Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
obtain 0 = 0:258, 1 = 0:768, and 2 = 0:031. There are two issues when using their results
in the current model. First, since the tax schedule (29) is estimated for incomes in 1990 U.S.
dollars and is not unit-independent, normalization is necessary. I follow Erosa and Koreshkova
(2007) and normalize 2, using the following formula and obtain e 2 which is used in the model:






where ymodel is the average income in the model, and yUS1990 is the average U.S. household income
in 1990, which is about USD 50,000. The second issue is that I use the progressive tax function
only for labor income, since I assume a proportional capital income tax rate and will investigate
the welfare consequences of changing the constant capital income tax rate. I will use the average
labor income in the model as ymodel, and leave other parameters intact.
Finally, considering that half of the social security contribution is paid by the employer and





















In order to investigate the importance of the progressivity of the labor income tax, I also
investigate the model economy with proportional labor income tax as a part of the sensitivity
analysis.
In the U.S., there is no federal tax for owner-occupied housing, but dierent local governments
impose residential property taxes with dierent rates. For example, according to the government
of the District of Columbia, if the tax rates applied in the largest city in each state are compared,
the median eective tax rate in 2004 is 1.54%. The National Association of Home Builders
7The tax rates are the averages between 1990 and 1996 of the eective tax rates computed by Mendoza, Razin,
and Tesar (1994). McGrattan (1994) and Joines (1981) obtain similar eective tax rates for the U.S.
16(NAHB) reports that, according to self-reported property tax rates in the 2000 Census, the
national average property tax rate in 2000 was 1.127%. Based on the evidence, P is set at 1.1%.
As a sensitivity analysis, the case where P = 0 is also studied later. P = 0 pertains to the idea
that the property taxes levied by local governments are benet taxes whose proceeds are used
by local governments to provide goods and services necessary for those who pay the taxes.
The Social Security tax rate S is set at 7:4%. According to Social Security Administration
(2007), the average labor income in 2003 is USD 32,808, while the average annual benet of
retired workers is USD 11,065.8 The replacement ratio, dened as the ratio between the two,
is 33:7%. The 7:4% social security tax rate in the model is determined such that, when the
government is balancing the budget in each period, the model replicates the replacement ratio.9
Since all the tax policies are set exogenously, the size of the government expenditure is obtained
ex-post in the stationary equilibrium of the model economy with the baseline specication. In
the baseline model with the tax rates described above and the social security tax that will be
described below, the total amount of government expenditures relative to output, including social
security expenditures, turns out to be 21:5%, which is close to the average size of expenditures
of the U.S. federal government.
4.7 Endogenously Calibrated Parameters
As I mentioned above, three parameters regarding the preference, the time discount factor ,
the parameter that determines the relative value of the utility from housing services,  , the
parameter that determines the relative value of leisure, ; and the minimum size of housing
owned, h
o, are calibrated endogenously. More specically, the four parameters are calibrated
such that four closely related targets are simultaneously satised in the stationary equilibrium
of the baseline model economy. The four targets are the total value of housing capital stock and
that of non-housing capital stock, the average hours spent working, and the homeownership rate.
According to the NIPA, the average value for the period 2002-2006 of private housing capital
relative to output (H
Y ) is 1.29, while the same statistic for non-housing capital (K
Y ) for the same
period is 1.47. In total, the average value of total private capital stock over output is 2.76 in the
U.S. As for the time spent on work, on average, workers spent one-third of their disposable time
for work. Therefore, I use ` = 0:33 as the target. The target homeownership rate is 64%.
To pin down the four parameters, it is necessary to compute the equilibrium of the model
repeatedly with a dierent set of parameter values, until the four statistics generated by the model
are close to the corresponding targets. Even though there is no guarantee that all the targets
can be satised, because of the non-linear nature of the problem, the calibration process turned
out to be successful, and it is found that  = 0:9774   = 0:8874,  = 0:3612, and h
o = 0:5305
jointly satisfy the four targets: H
Y = 1:29, K
Y = 1:47, ` = 0:33, and the homeownership rate of
0:64.
8This number is computed by multiplying the monthly benet of retired workers of USD 922.1 by 12.
9Government budget balance implies SmWe = bmR where mW and mR are measures of workers and retirees,
respectively, and e and b represent average labor income and benets, respectively. Plugging in b
e = 0:337 and
mR
mW = 0:221 yields S = 0:074.
17Table 1: Comparison of the Model Economies














4.8 Model Economy with One Asset
One of the key exercises in the paper is to compare the optimal capital income tax rate in the
model economy with both housing and nancial assets (two-asset model) and in the economy
without housing (one-asset model). This one-asset model is constructed by treating housing
assets as part of nancial assets. Table 1 compares the two model economies.
In the economy without housing, the parameter controlling the capital share of income, , is
higher because the capital income includes what is generated by housing capital. According to
NIPA,  for the one-asset model turns out to be 0:326, which is close to the value usually used in
the models with one type of capital. The depreciation rate for capital K is also adjusted, taking
into account that capital in the one-asset model also includes housing capital which depreciates
more slowly than non-housing capital. Naturally, the depreciation rate is lower. According to
NIPA, the annual depreciation rate associated with capital in the one-asset model is 6:6%.
Notice that the parameters  and  are re-calibrated for the one-asset model such that the
model satises the capital output ratio of 2:76 and the average fraction of time spent working at
0:33.   and h
o are not used in a meaningful way in the one-asset model.
5 Computation
Since the model cannot be solved analytically, numerical methods are used to compute the
stationary equilibrium of the model. The solution method is a standard one for overlapping
generations models.10 In solving the problem of an individual agent, the optimal decision rules
are approximated using piecewise linear functions, and the optimal decision rules are obtained
backwards, starting from the last period of life.
A challenge for the current model is that there are two types of assets. When the set of
individual state variables includes two endogenous continuous state variables, the model is very
10For more details on the computational methods employed here, see R os-Rull (1999).
18dicult to solve with a decent level of accuracy. This is especially so if there is a tenure choice
as well as labor-leisure decision. However, it is feasible to solve the current model because there
is only one continuous state variable, which is the total wealth x. The set of individual state
variables of agents does not include h and a separately but does include only x, because the
allocation between h and a does not aect the agents' optimal decision.
In obtaining the aggregate statistics, I implement a simulation with 1;000;000 agents in each
generation. Appendix A.3 includes further details of the computation.
6 Properties of the Baseline Model Economy
Figure 1 exhibits the life-cycle proles in the baseline model economy. Figure 1(a) shows the
average life-cycle prole of housing and nancial asset holdings, as well as the total wealth in the
baseline model economy. The most striking feature of the gure is that the portfolio allocation
between housing and nancial assets varies greatly with age. At the beginning of their working
lives, agents save to prepare for the down payment on their rst house. They rent while doing
so. Then agents borrow using mortgage loans and accumulate housing assets. Around age
30, average agents nish repaying mortgage loans and start accumulating savings in the form
of nancial assets, after accumulating sucient housing assets to support a desirable amount
of housing service consumption. After retirement, agents reduce nancial asset holdings more
quickly than housing assets, because agents need housing for consumption of housing services.
Toward the end of the life-cycle, agents reduce holdings of both types of assets. The hump
shape of durable goods, whose main component is housing, is well documented by Fern andez-
Villaverde and Krueger (2005). In terms of the ratio of housing assets over total wealth, the
ratio is much higher for young agents because they use leverage when they own housing assets
whose value is larger than the value of their total wealth. The ratio keeps going down as agents
accumulate nancial assets relative to housing assets. Silos (2007) documents the pattern of the
housing-to-wealth ratio in the U.S. data.
Figure 1(b) shows the average life-cycle prole of before- and after-tax income and consump-
tion in the baseline model economy. The after-tax total income in the gure includes the social
security benet and excludes tax payments and social security contributions. The prole of the
after-tax total income is 
atter than that of the before-tax total income, not only because of
the intergenerational transfer through the social security program, but also because workers are
taxed more heavily than retirees. The life-cycle prole of consumption is even 
atter than after-
tax income, but still remains hump shaped. The hump shape of non-housing consumption of U.S.
consumers is carefully documented by Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Fern andez-Villaverde
and Krueger (2005).
Figure 1(c) shows the average life-cycle prole of hours worked. Hours worked increase in the
early 20s as agents try to accumulate assets to purchase a house. After the mid-20s, the prole is
mostly decreasing over the life-cycle, because of the income eect for the earlier stage of working
life and because of the substitution eect for the latter stage of working life. After the retirement
age of 64, there are no hours for work.
Figure 1(d) shows the average life-cycle prole of tax payments. The majority of taxes paid
by workers is labor income tax. Workers close to retirement age pay approximately the same































































































































































































































(f) Housing Assets: Owned and Rented
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Consumption (one-asset model)
(b) Consumption and Income
Figure 2: Comparison of Two-Asset and One-Asset Model
Figure 1(e) shows the life-cycle of the homeownership rate in the baseline model economy.
The overall average homeownership rate is calibrated to be 64% in the model. It exhibits a
hump shape, as in the U.S. data. The ratio is low for young agents, peaks around age 55, and
goes down after retirement age.
Figure 1(f) shows the average life-cycle prole of all housing assets, including owner-occupied
as well as rented housing. The prole for owner-occupied housing is the same as the one shown
in Figure 1(a). For very young and very old agents, more housing assets are rented rather than
owned. Therefore, the average life-cycle prole of total housing assets is located higher than
the prole of owner-occupied housing for the young and retirees. Consumption of non-housing
goods, which is captured by the total housing holdings in Figure 1(f), is hump shaped, as in the
U.S. data.
Figure 2(a) and 2(b) compare average life-cycle proles of assets and consumption between
the two-asset baseline model and the one-asset model. The one-asset model is calibrated to the
same set of targets as the two-asset model as long as it is feasible. The striking feature is that the
life-cycle proles of total wealth and consumption are very close to each other, although there is
an interesting life-cycle prole for the asset portfolio between the housing and nancial assets in
the two-asset model.
7 Design of Experiments
7.1 Design of Alternative Tax Systems
A tax system is dened as T = (K;H;M;P;0;1;2) for the two-asset model and T =
(K;0;1;2) for the one-asset model. A revenue-neutral tax system is a tax system that gen-
erates the total tax revenue equal to the government expenditure G, which is obtained in the
stationary equilibrium of the baseline economy. Suppose a housing tax system (H;M;P) (only
for the two-asset model), and two parameters of the labor income tax system (1;2) are given.
Then, for a capital income tax rate K, a revenue-neutral tax system is given by a 0 that
21guarantees revenue neutrality. In other words, a revenue-neutral tax system is characterized
by the capital income tax rate K. The main experiment of the paper is to nd the optimal
revenue-neutral tax system T , which maximizes the social welfare (dened in the next section),
Let me make four remarks about the design of the experiments. First, since all the experi-
ments are implemented in a revenue-neutral manner, the total tax revenue is the same across all
alternative tax systems. The total tax revenue in the two-asset model turned out to be 21.5% of
the total output. Second, 0 is associated with the average level of the labor income tax. Roughly
speaking, changing 0 while leaving 1 and 2 unchanged is equivalent to shifting the average tax
rate without aecting the degree of progressivity. Third, in the case in which proportional labor
income tax is used instead of the progressive labor income tax, as a part of the robustness exer-
cises, the proportional labor income tax rate L is adjusted to ensure revenue neutrality. Fourth,
Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) explore the optimal combination of (K;0;1) while using
2 to ensure revenue neutrality, using a model without housing. I do not jointly search for the
optimal labor income tax schedule like they do, mainly because the current model is substantially
harder to solve than theirs, which makes searching jointly for the optimal capital income tax rate
and the optimal labor income schedule infeasible. However, it is likely that the intuition of the
main ndings of the paper remain valid for cases when the optimal labor income tax schedule is
searched jointly with the capital income tax rate. For example, using proportional labor income
tax instead of the progressive one does not change the main result of the paper, as shown in
Section 9.
For the two-asset model, it is necessary to pre-set the housing tax system (H;M;P), which
is not present in the standard one-asset environment. I investigate three cases. In the rst
case, I maintain the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing. Specically, I keep
H = 0, M = 0:23 and P = 0:011. In the second case, I require that the existing preferential
tax treatment for owner-occupied housing is eliminated. In particular, I impose that the housing
and nancial assets be taxed at the same rate, i.e., K = H = M and change K (= H = M) to
various rates. P is kept at the baseline rate of 1.1%. It will be shown that the choice of M does
not play a signicant role for the result; what matters is the choice of H. Finally, I will allow
both K and H to be chosen independently without a restriction and investigate the optimal
combination of the two. I keep P and M at the baseline rates of 0.011 and 0.23, respectively.
It turns out that the choice of M does not play an important role for the results, either.
7.2 Welfare Measures
In comparing the social welfare in economies with dierent tax systems, I use the ex-ante expected
utility of newborns in the stationary equilibrium. This social welfare is used by Conesa, Kitao,
and Krueger (2009), which makes the comparison straightforward. This also corresponds to the
long-run social welfare in the model with innitely lived agents. Technically, the social welfare is
computed by integrating the value of the newborns into the stationary equilibrium with respect
to the initial shock to individual labor productivity. The welfare criterion is useful in taking into
account both the eciency eect due to tax reforms and the redistribution or insurance aspect of
tax reforms. The consideration of the latter is crucially important in experiments where markets
are incomplete, and therefore, agents are ex-post heterogeneous.
Like Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009), I do not use the utilitarian welfare function of the
22living agents in the initial stationary equilibrium with transition path taken into account, as
the measure of social welfare, for the following reasons.11 First, it is extremely challenging to
nd the optimal tax system taking the transition into account, since the model is hard to solve
even for a stationary equilibrium. Second, the social welfare employed here and the associated
denition of the optimality corresponds to the long-run optimal taxation in the growth model,
which is typically used in the literature. The employed social welfare makes the comparison with
the literature straightforward.
In measuring the magnitude of the welfare gain or loss, I use the percentage changes in
the consumption of non-housing goods. This is a standard measure for welfare analysis in the
literature. Using this measure, the welfare gain by moving from one tax system to another is
dened as the percentage increment  to the consumption of non-housing goods in every period
and under every contingency in the economy with the original tax system, which equates average
welfare in the economy with the original tax system to that of the economy with the alternative
tax system. A positive  implies that agents are better o by being born into the economy with
the alternative tax system, in the expected ex-ante sense. Notice that, in the current model,
there are three sources of utility, namely, consumption of non-housing goods, consumption of
housing services, and leisure, but percentage  is added only to the consumption of non-housing
goods in computing the welfare gain. In other words, welfare changes associated with changes in
the consumption of housing services as well as leisure are converted and merged into the welfare
changes in the consumption of non-housing goods in computing the welfare gain.
Moreover, for an analytical purpose, I decompose  as follows:
 = a + d (32)
where a measures the welfare gain associated with changes in aggregate consumption. In par-
ticular, a measure the welfare gain by uniformly increasing consumption of all agents in each
period and state by the growth rates of aggregate consumption. I call a the aggregate eect. For
an economy without heterogeneity and life-cycle, the aggregate eect coincides with the total
welfare eect. On the other hand, d represents the welfare gain associated with the redistribu-
tion of consumption across age and node. I call the eect the redistribution eect. The formal
denitions are provided in Appendix A.4.
8 Optimal Capital Income Taxation
8.1 With Preferential Treatment for Owner-Occupied Housing
Table 2 summarizes the eect of implementing the optimal capital income tax rate in the baseline
two-asset model economy. For a comparison, the result from the one-asset model economy is also
shown. In the one-asset model where the dierence between housing and non-housing capital is
ignored, and labor income taxation exhibits progressivity, the optimal capital income tax rate is
found to be 31% (see the second column of Table 2). The rate is not only non-zero, but far from
zero, as Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) nd. The optimal capital income tax rate found
11The separate appendix of Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) shows that their main result { that the optimal
capital income tax rate is substantially higher than zero { is strengthened when the transition to the new steady
state is taken into account.
23Table 2: Optimal Capital Taxation: With Preferential Tax Treatment for Owner-
Occupied Housing
Economy One-asset model Two-asset model
Baseline Optimal K = 0:011 Baseline Optimal K = 0:312
Tax rates
H       0.000 0.000 0.000
M       0.230 0.230 0.230
K 0.400 0.310 0.010 0.400 0.010 0.310
3
0 0.258 0.304 0.429 0.258 0.360 0.288
% change from the baseline4
Output(=Y) 0.589  0:45  3:23 0.404  0:64  0:05
Total capital/Y 2.760 +2.30 +8.32 2.760 +0.09 +0.35
Housing capital/Y       1.290  12:56  2:58
Non-housing capital/Y 2.760 +2.30 +8.32 1.470 +11.18 +2.92
Average hours worked 0.330  1:52  6:63 0.330  4:19  1:01
Labor supply 0.360  1:54  6:89 0.356  4:04  0:99
Consumption 0.372  1:34  6:74 0.253  3:22  0:74
Homeownership rate5       0.640 0.360 0.619
% change in welfare6
Overall eect ()   +0.09  0:78   +1.20 +0.44
Aggregate eect (a)    0:13  0:58    2:16  0:53
Redistribution eect (d)   +0.22  0:20   +3.36 +0.97
1 Optimal level for the two-asset model.
2 Optimal level for the one-asset model.
3 Adjusted to guarantee revenue neutrality.
4 Level is shown for the baseline economy.
5 Level is shown for all economies.
6 Measured by the uniform percentage increase in 
ow consumption of non-housing goods, against
the welfare in the baseline model economy.
here (31%) is close to the optimal rate of Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009), which is 36%. As
Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) argue, it is optimal to tax capital income heavily in a model
where there is a strong life-cycle savings motive and thus the savings decisions of agents are not
strongly elastic against changes in the after-tax interest rate. They argue that the inelasticity
of saving relative to labor supply makes a high capital income tax rate optimal in the economy
with life-cycle, while it is optimal not to tax capital in an economy without life-cycle.
When the capital income tax rate is lowered from the baseline level of 40% to the optimal level
of 31% in the one-asset model (see the second column of Table 2), the average labor income tax
rate has to be increased to guarantee the revenue neutrality. Naturally, capital stock increases, by
2.3%, while labor supply declines by 1.5%. Aggregate output and aggregate consumption decline,
24by 0.5% and 1.3%, respectively. The total welfare gain is equivalent to a mere 0.1% increase in
consumption in each period and node. Although the aggregate eect is negative, re
ecting the
decline in aggregate consumption, the positive redistribution eect more than osets the negative
aggregate eect. The overall size of the welfare gain by moving from the baseline economy to the
one with the optimal tax rate is small, because the baseline economy with a 40% capital income
tax rate is close to the economy with the optimal capital income tax rate.
Now, turn to the fth column of Table 2. It is found that the optimal capital income tax
rate in the two-asset economy when the preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing is
preserved (to be precise, H = 0% and M = 23%) to be 1%. The optimal capital income tax
rate is very close to zero and is remarkably dierent from the case in which there is no distinction
between housing and non-housing assets (one-asset economy), where the optimal capital tax rate
is 31%. 0, which roughly represents the average labor income tax level, must be increased from
26% to 36% to keep revenue neutrality. Output in the new steady state with the optimal capital
income tax rate of 1% declines by 0.64%, since a decline in the labor supply ( 4%) dominates
an increase in the non-housing capital stock (+11:2%).
The overall welfare gain is an increase of 1:2% measured as a uniform increase in consumption
in each period and node. This is a large gain. In terms of the composition, the aggregate eect is
negative ( 2:2%), as a result of a drop in aggregate consumption and housing capital stock, but
the large positive redistribution eect (+3:4%) more than osets the negative aggregate eect.
Also notice that if the capital income tax rate found to be optimal using the one-asset model
(31%) is implemented (see the last column of Table 2), there is still a welfare gain (0.4%) but
the gain is smaller than would have been achieved by implementing a 1% capital income tax.
On the other hand, if the optimal capital income tax rate of 1% is implemented in the one-asset
model, there is a large welfare loss ( 0:8%).
Figure 3 compares the welfare eect of changing the capital income tax rate between 0% to
60%, for both one-asset and two-asset models. Since the baseline tax rate is 40%, the welfare
eect for the one-asset model (solid line) and that for the two-asset model (dotted line) associated
with a 40% capital income tax rate is zero. While social welfare quickly starts to decline as the
capital income tax rate is lowered from the baseline rate of 40% in the one-asset model, social
welfare is almost monotonically increasing in the two-asset model.
What generates the dierence in the optimal capital income tax rate between the one-asset
model and the two-asset model? There are three key intuitions. First, when the capital income
tax rate is increased, agents can evade the higher tax by shifting their portfolio to housing.
Although this intuition is more straightforward if there are closer substitutes, such as other
nancial assets that are not subject to the increased tax, the same logic applies to housing,
which is an imperfect substitute for nancial assets. Second, lowering the capital income tax
rate while keeping the exemption for imputed rents of owner-occupied housing means nullifying
the tax wedge between the two types of capital and thus correcting the over-accumulation of
housing capital. When there is no tax for owner-occupied housing but capital income is heavily
taxed, the tax wedge between the two discourages investment in non-housing capital compared
with investment in housing capital. Third, a higher capital income tax rate accompanied by the
preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing is a subsidy for homeowners at the expense
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Figure 3: Comparison of Welfare Eects of Changing Capital Income Tax
renting and owning. The unit cost of renting a house is the rent, q = r + P + H. What is the
cost of owning? For an agent who does not take a mortgage, it is e q = P +H +rH +r(1 K).
The rst three terms are straightforward; a homeowner has to pay property tax, maintenance
costs (depreciation), and housing tax, if there is one. The last term r(1   K) represents the
opportunity cost of owning a house instead of investing in nancial assets instead. The last term
has (1   K) because the nancial asset return is subject to the capital income tax. If q and e q
are compared, it is easy to see that owning is less costly if K > H. It is trivially satised in the
baseline model (and in the U.S. economy), where H = 0. In other words, renters pay more than
homeowners to enjoy the same house by K  H. There are renters in the baseline model in spite
of the benet of being a homeowner precisely because of the lumpiness of housing; agents cannot
own a house that is smaller than a positive lower bound h
o. In the baseline model, renters suer
by either paying extra to enjoy the same amount of housing services consumption, or they live in
a larger house than they would if tax breaks did not exist, in order to enjoy the tax benets for
homeowners (although they would like to remain renters if there is no tax break for homeowners).
Since renters have typically lower income, the preferential tax treatment for homeowners works
as a tax for lower-income agents who choose to rent. The tax wedge between K and H, which
represents the additional tax for renters, declines (disappears) when the capital income tax rate
is brought down (to zero), in case the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housings is
preserved. You can see in Table 2 that the homeownership rate drops from the baseline level of
64% to 36% when the capital income tax rate is lowered to 1% and owning relative to renting
becomes less attractive. How important are the three channels mentioned above? To answer the
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(d) Taxes
Figure 4: Average Life-Cycle Proles of Two-Asset Model with the Optimal Capital
Taxation (with Preferential Tax Treatment for Owner-Occupied Housing)
Figure 4 compares the average life-cycle proles of model economies with the baseline tax
rates and the optimal tax rates together with the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied
housing. Figure 4(a) shows that there is a substantial portfolio reallocation from housing to
nancial assets. Figure 4(b) and Figure 4(c) show that the changes in consumption and labor
supply are small. But Figure 4(d) shows that there is a noticeable change in the life-cycle prole
of tax payments; the young, who are more likely to be borrowing-constrained, and the middle-
aged, who are the most productive, pay more taxes in the alternative tax system as labor income
tax becomes the main source of government income. Finally, notice that the welfare gain that
stems from the narrowed tax wedge between housing and non-housing capital income is enjoyed
at the expense of a higher average labor income tax. But lowering the capital income tax rate is
not the only way to narrow the wedge, if the tax rate applied to imputed rents of owner-occupied
housing is not xed at zero as in the baseline. If the gap is narrowed without applying a high
27Table 3: Optimal Capital Taxation: Without Preferential Tax Treatment for
Owner-Occupied Housing
Economy Baseline Optimal
Preferential tax treatment for housing Yes Yes No Only M Only H
Tax rates
H 0.000 0.000 = K = K 0.000
M 0.230 0.230 = K 0.230 = K
K 0.400 0.010 0.240 0.240 0.010
1
0 0.258 0.360 0.281 0.281 0.359
% change from the baseline2
Output(=Y) 0.404  0:64 +1.44 +1.44  0:52
Total capital/Y 2.760 +0.09  4:58  4:58  0:17
Housing capital/Y 1.290  12:56  18:56  18:56  13:46
Non-housing capital/Y 1.470 +11.18 +7.69 +7.69 +11.49
Average hours worked 0.330  4:19  1:22  1:22  4:15
Labor supply 0.356  4:04  0:10  0:10  4:01
Consumption 0.253  3:22 +0.71 +0.71  3:10
Homeownership rate3 0.640 0.360 0.252 0.163 0.324
% change in welfare4
Overall eect ()   +1.20 +1.60 +1.60 +1.24
Aggregate eect (a)    2:16  2:08  2:08  2:23
Redistribution eect (d)   +3.36 +3.68 +3.68 +3.47
1 Adjusted to guarantee revenue neutrality.
2 Level is shown for the baseline economy.
3 Level is shown for all economies.
4 Measured by the uniform percentage increase in 
ow consumption of non-housing goods,
against the welfare in the baseline model economy.
labor income tax rate, there might be an even larger welfare gain. That is shown to be the case
in the next section.
8.2 Without Preferential Tax Treatment for Owner-Occupied Housing
In this section I will show that the optimal capital income tax rate crucially depends on the tax
system associated with housing. The previous section showed that the two-asset model developed
in this paper has a very dierent implication regarding the optimal capital taxation, compared
with the one-asset model that is usually used in the literature. In this section, I will show that
how capital should be taxed depends crucially on how housing is taxed. Table 3 summarizes the
main results. The rst and the second columns are duplicated from Table 2 for comparison; they
show the properties of the baseline model, and the properties of the economy under the optimal
capital income tax rate, conditional on the current preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied
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Figure 5: Average Life-Cycle Proles of Two-Asset Model with the Optimal Capital
Taxation (without Preferential Tax Treatment for Owner-Occupied Housing)
with the optimal capital income tax rate, under three alternative housing tax systems.
The third column of Table 3 contains the most important results in the table. I restrict
tax rates for imputed rents of owner-occupied housing (H) as well as the mortgage interest
payment deduction rate (M) to be equal to the capital income tax rate (K) and nd the
optimal K under this restriction. We can interpret the experiment as nding the optimal capital
income tax rate when the preferential tax treatment for housing is eliminated. Remember that
r(K   H) represents the additional unit cost that renters have to pay to live in the same
house as homeowners and this becomes zero under the current housing tax system. As you can
see, the optimal capital tax rate is 24%, which is substantially higher than the optimal rate
obtained under the restriction that the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing is
preserved. In terms of the welfare eect, the welfare gain of implementing this tax system is even
larger, at 1.6% of 
ow consumption, than the one obtained in the previous section (1.2%). In
29Figure 3, the welfare eect of changing the capital income tax rate conditional on the elimination
of the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housings is also drawn (dashed line). At the
capital income tax rate of zero, the eect on social welfare is almost identical with and without
the exemption of imputed rents; the only dierence is the deduction rate of the mortgage interest
payment. But the welfare eect as the capital income tax rate is increased is strikingly dierent.
The dierence is generated because the tax wedge between housing and capital income changes
dierently as the capital income tax rate is increased. In the case investigated in the previous
section, a higher capital income tax implies a higher tax wedge, or more favorable tax treatment
for owner-occupied housing, but the tax wedge does not change in the case studied in this
section. Also notice that eliminating the tax wedge while keeping the capital income tax rate at
the baseline level (40%) alone generates a large (1.4%) welfare gain. Compared with the size of
the welfare gain, achieving the optimal level of the capital income tax rate (additional 0.2%) is
small. It is also suggested by the fact that the dashed line in Figure 3 is substantially above the
dotted line.
Why is the size of the welfare gain even higher? To answer this question, see Figure 5, which
compares the baseline model economy and the economy with the optimal capital income tax rate,
and without preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing. First, Figure 5(a) shows that
the optimal tax system induces agents to shift their portfolio from housing to nancial assets.
The eect on the asset portfolio is similar to the case in which housing's preferential tax treatment
is preserved (see Figure 4(a)). Figure 5(b) and 5(c) show that the average life-cycle prole of
consumption and hours worked does not change noticeably by implementing the optimal tax
system. However, there is a signicant dierence between Figure 5(d) and Figure 4(d). In the
case studied in the previous section, the optimal tax system shifts the burden of taxes to younger
and more productive agents. On the other hand, in the current case, the average life-cycle prole
of total taxes does not change substantially by implementing the optimal tax system. This is
where the additional welfare gain is coming from. In the case in which the preferential tax
treatment for owner-occupied housing is preserved by assumption, the capital income tax rate is
lowered, and the average labor income tax rate must be raised, to narrow the tax wedge between
housing and nancial assets. In the case in which the preferential tax treatment is eliminated,
since the tax wedge is already zero by assumption, there is no need to increase the average labor
income tax rate to ll the tax wedge. In other words, when the preferential tax treatment for
owner-occupied housing is eliminated, there is no trade-o between narrowing the tax wedge
between housing and nancial assets, and avoiding a severe labor supply distortion.
The last two columns of Table 3 basically show that the mortgage interest payment deduction
is not crucial in shaping the optimal capital income taxation. More specically, the fourth column
shows the case in which the housing tax rate (H) is restricted to be equal to the capital income
tax rate (K), but the mortgage interest payment deduction rate (M) is left at the baseline rate
of 23%. The result is that the optimal tax system is virtually identical to the one just presented;
the level of M does not matter for the optimal level of K. The last column is associated with
the case in which the tax exemption for owner-occupied housing is preserved (H = 0) while
M is restricted to be equal to K. Again, the optimal tax system is very similar to the one in
which both H and M are xed at their baseline values. In sum, the role of the mortgage interest
payment deduction is very minor compared with the importance of the taxation of imputed rents
30Table 4: Optimal Capital Taxation: Robustness
Economy1 One-asset model Two-asset model
Opt. K Welfare2 Opt. 3
K Welfare2 Opt. 4
K Welfare2
1. Baseline 0.31 +0.09 0.01 +1.20 0.24 +1.60
2. Separable utility 0.20 +0.35 0.00 +1.17 0.15 +1.35
3. Inelastic labor 0.00 +1.90 0.00 +2.60 0.00 +2.67
4. No tenure decision 0.31 +0.09 0.15 +0.36 0.22 +0.51
5. Consumption tax 0.35 +0.02 0.01 +0.98 0.29 +1.65
6. No property tax 0.31 +0.09 0.00 +1.35 0.33 +2.43
7. Proportional tax 0.44 +0.02 0.04 +0.46 0.45 +1.70
8. Lower down payment 0.31 +0.09 0.00 +1.16 0.24 +1.58
9. Lower income ineq. 0.37 +0.02 0.20 +0.36 0.34 +1.37
1 For rows 2-4, the models are re-calibrated to the same set of targets as for the baseline
model. For other rows, the parameters of the baseline model are used but a new baseline is
obtained under the respective assumptions. For the welfare calculation, the newly obtained
baseline is used for the basis of comparison.
2 Measured by the uniform percentage increase in 
ow consumption of non-housing goods,
against the welfare in the baseline model economy.
3 The preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing is preserved.
4 The preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing is eliminated.
of owner-occupied housing.
8.3 Optimal Combination of Housing and Capital Taxation
In the last two sections, I explore the optimal capital income taxation, given the housing tax
systems. What does the optimal taxation system look like if there is no restriction and the
housing tax policy can be chosen as well? Based on the nding in the previous section that the
mortgage interest payment deduction rate (M) does not play an important role in shaping the
optimal taxation system, I x M at the baseline rate of 23%, and explore the optimal combination
of the capital income tax rate (K) and the tax rate for imputed rents of owner-occupied housing
(H). As in the previous cases, I use the average labor income tax rate (0) to guarantee revenue
neutrality. Somewhat surprisingly, the optimal combination of (K;H) turns out to be the one
found under the restriction of K = H, i.e., the case shown in the fourth column of Table 3. The
optimal combination is found to be (K;H) = (0:24;0:24). The optimal tax system in which K
and H can be chosen independently is consistent with the following two intuitions. First, as in
Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009), it is optimal to tax capital (and housing) at a high tax rate
in the overlapping generations model. Second, it is optimal not to create a tax wedge between
two assets.
319 Robustness Analysis
Table 4 compares the results when the main experiments are implemented under alternative
assumptions. The rst two columns show the optimal capital income tax rate and the associated
welfare gain in the one-asset model. The last four columns are associated with the two-asset
model. The third and fourth columns show the optimal tax system with the preferential tax
treatment for owner-occupied housing being preserved, and the last two columns are for the case
in which the housing tax breaks are eliminated.
9.1 Alternative Assumption on Preference
The rst row (labeled as baseline) replicates the main results of the baseline model, for com-
parison. The second row (labeled as separable utility) presents the results of the model with
the separable utility function instead of the non-separable one. The functional form is shown
in Section 4.2. The alternative model is calibrated to match the same set of targets as in the
baseline model. Although the optimal tax rates are lower than in the baseline, the main results
of the baseline model are valid with the separable utility function; the optimal capital income
tax rate in the two-asset model when the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing
is preserved is lower (actually it is zero) than in the one-asset model where there is no distinc-
tion between housing and non-housing assets (20%). On the other hand, the optimal capital
income tax rate is substantially higher (15%) when the tax breaks for owner-occupied housing
are eliminated.
The third row (labeled as inelastic labor) is an interesting case. It is assumed that labor is
inelastically supplied. Under this assumption, labor income tax is non-distortionary, although
there are distributional consequences. Therefore, there is no eciency loss from labor income
taxation. Not surprisingly, under the assumption of inelastic labor supply, the optimal capital in-
come tax rate is zero for all cases; it is optimal to raise tax revenues solely from non-distortionary
labor income taxation rather than distortionary capital income taxation.
9.2 No Tenure Decision
The fourth row (labeled as no tenure decision) is the case in which there is no tenure decision
in the two-asset model. In particular, the option of renting is eliminated and the lower bound
of owned housing assets h
o is set at zero; agents cannot rent housing but can own housing of
any size, as long as the down payment constraint is satised. Interestingly, although the optimal
capital income tax rate is still lower (15% compared to 22%) when the preferential tax treatment
for owner-occupied housing is preserved, the dierence is smaller than in the baseline, and the
welfare gain is also noticeably smaller. For example, when housing and nancial assets are taxed
equally, the welfare gain associated with the optimal tax rate is 0.51% of 
ow consumption,
which is substantially smaller than the welfare gain in the baseline (1.6%). We can interpret
this as suggesting that a large part of the welfare gain in the two-asset baseline model, and the
major reasoning behind the baseline results, is associated with the redistribution eect between
homeowners and renters. In the baseline experiment, reducing the tax wedge between housing
and non-housing capital implies a reduction in subsidies to homeowners, who are on average
higher earners, at the expense of renters, who are on average lower earners. In the current setup
without tenure decision, the benet of lowering the capital income tax rate is smaller because
32there is no gain associated with nullifying implicit subsidies to homeowners. However, there is
still a welfare gain from correcting over-investment of housing capital.
9.3 Alternative Tax Systems
The fth row (labeled as consumption tax) of Table 4 shows the results of the model with a
consumption tax. In particular, the consumption tax captures the sales tax that is present in
most U.S. states; there is a proportional tax for all non-housing goods but there is no tax for
rents. The consumption tax rate is set at 5%, which is the estimate of Mendoza, Razin, and
Tesar (1994) and is used by Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) as well. As you can see in the
table, the main result of the baseline model is not aected by the existence of the consumption
tax. The optimal capital income tax rate in the one-asset model is 35%, which is exactly the
same as in Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009). On the other hand, the optimal capital income
tax rate is 1% with the housing tax breaks, and 29% without the tax breaks.
The sixth row (labeled as no property tax) is the case in which the property tax, whose baseline
value is 1.1%, is eliminated. Since property tax plays no role in the one-asset model, the results
are the same for the one-asset model as for the baseline case. For the two-asset model, as in
the baseline experiments, it is optimal not to tax capital if the preferential tax treatment for
owner-occupied housing is preserved, while it is optimal to tax capital at a high rate when the
housing tax breaks are eliminated.
The seventh row (labeled as proportional tax) is the case in which proportional labor income
tax is used instead of the baseline progressive labor income tax. The main results of the paper
still survive; the optimal capital income tax rate with and without tax breaks for housing is 4%
and 45%, respectively, while the optimal rate is 44% under the one-asset model.
9.4 Lower Down Payment
In the eighth row (labeled as lower down payment), the down payment ratio of 10% ( = 0:1)
instead of 20% ( = 0:2) is used. A reduction in the down payment requirement is one of
the major changes that has happened in the U.S. mortgage markets since 1990s. According to
Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2009a), the average down payment ratio declined from
21.6% in 1995 to 16.3% in 2003 for mortgages oered by the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) and 29.8% to 24.1% for other loans. The question concerning the experiment is the eect
of the lowered down payment requirement on the optimal capital income taxation. It turns out
that the results with a lower down payment are very close to those of the baseline model economy,
suggesting that the down payment ratio does not have a substantial eect on the optimal level
of the capital income tax.
9.5 Higher Income Inequality
Finally, in the ninth row (labeled as lower income inequality), I investigate the link between the
degree of income inequality and the socially desirable capital income tax rate. In particular, I
halve the standard deviation of the individual productivity shocks and redo the experiments. In
the case of the one-asset model, the optimal capital income tax rate is higher (37%) than in the
baseline experiment (31%). The optimal capital income tax rates are higher in the experiments
with the two-asset model as well. In particular, the optimal rate is now 20% when the housing
tax breaks are preserved. When the dispersion of productivity and income is smaller, the gain
33from weakening the redistribution eect from owners to renters is small, which reduces the
welfare gain from lowering the capital income tax rate in the economy with a lower income
dispersion. However, the key main result that the capital income tax rate should be lower when
the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing exits is still valid.
10 Conclusion
This paper quantitatively investigates the optimal capital income taxation in the general equilib-
rium overlapping generations model in which characteristics of housing and the U.S. preferential
tax treatment of owner-occupied housing are carefully captured. There are three main ndings.
First, given the current preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing, the optimal cap-
ital income tax rate is close to zero. In the baseline experiment, the optimal rate is found to be
1%. It is very dierent from the optimal rate in the standard model in which housing and non-
housing capital are not distinguished (31%). The key intuition is that lowering the capital income
tax rate works to narrow the tax wedge between housing and non-housing and thus indirectly
nullies the preferential tax treatment for homeowners at the expense of renters. Second, if the
preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing is eliminated, it is optimal to tax housing
and non-housing at a higher rate. In the baseline model, the optimal rate is 24%. When the tax
breaks are eliminated, lowering the capital income tax no longer generates the welfare gain of
narrowing the tax wedge of the two kinds of capital. The general message of the experiments is
that optimal capital income taxation should be analyzed as a package together with other taxes;
housing tax policy aects the answer to how the government should tax capital income. Finally,
the welfare gain of implementing the optimal tax system is large, above 1% of 
ow consumption
in both cases. It implies that implementing the optimal capital income tax rate obtained from
the model without housing incurs a large welfare loss.
The main ndings suggest that regardless of what kind of housing policy is assumed, the
optimal capital income tax rate is associated with nullifying the preferential tax treatment for
owner-occupied housing. Therefore, if there is some non-economic reason that supports home-
ownership, it becomes optimal to keep the capital income tax rate high, as in Conesa, Kitao, and
Krueger (2009). However, one should be aware that the reason why capital income should be
heavily taxed is dierent between the model with and without housing. Explicitly incorporating
the benets of the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing in the analysis is left
for future work.
Finally, as I mentioned in the introduction, dierent countries have dierent policies toward
housing taxation. According to European Central Bank (2003), the U.S., U.K., Germany, and
France do not tax the imputed rents of owner-occupied housing, but Denmark, the Netherlands,
and Sweden do tax imputed rents. Why is there such dierence across countries? Understanding
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Figure 7: Average Life-Cycle Prole
of Labor Productivity
A.2 Computing Cross-Sectional Variances of Hourly Wage from PSID
I use the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID), waves 1967-1996.12 Since each wave of PSID
covers income and hours worked in the previous year, the data set covers the years 1966-1995.
Following Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), I construct each year as an overlapping panel
of three years. For example, year 1968 consists of actual years of 1967, 1968, and 1969. This
overlapping panel structure helps maintaining a broad cross-section and a stable age distribution,
but still enables identication of time series parameters.
Following Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), I use the households (i) whose head is
between 22 and 64 years of age, (ii) have a positive core weight, (iii) labor income of the head is
not top-coded, (iv) hourly wage of the head (computed by dividing the annual labor income of
the head by the total hours worked by the head in the same year) is above half of the minimum
wage of the respective year, (v) hours worked by the head is between 520 and 5096 hours, and
(vi) all the conditions are satised in two consecutive years. The nominal hourly wage is de
ated
using the consumer price index (CPI) for respective years.
I compute the cross-sectional variances of the logarithm of real hourly wage of the heads of
households, for each age between 22 and 64. The variances are net of cohort eect; i.e., the
variance for each age captures the one to a group of households with heads born in the same
year. This is accomplished by a cohort and age dummy-variable regression developed by Deaton
and Paxon (1994) and also used in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004).
Figure 8 shows the age eect on the cross-sectional variances of logarithm of the real hourly
wage of heads of households. The age eect is normalized by adding the cohort eect of house-
holds whose heads are age 42 in 1994 (the last year in the sample). The cross-sectional variance
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Figure 8: Cross-Sectional Variances of Log-Hourly Wages
takes the value of 0.197 and 0.674 for age 22 and 64, respectively, and almost linearly increases
between age 22 and 64.
A.3 Computation
This appendix gives details about the solution algorithm of the stationary recursive competitive
equilibrium. I focus on the baseline model with housing and a progressive labor income tax. The
solution algorithm of other model economies is basically the same, with minor modications
1. Fix the capital income tax rate K as well as the housing tax system H, M, and P. The
baseline values are K = 0:40, H = 0, M = 0:23, and P = 0:011. For the case of the
baseline model, a parameter of the progressive labor income tax rate, 0, is xed at the
estimated value of 0 = 0:258. In other experiments, 0 is adjusted together with prices
such that the total tax revenue is the same as the one obtained in the baseline model
(revenue neutrality).
2. Guess prices r, w, amount of lump-sum transfer t, amount of social security benet b, and
tax rate 0 (it is xed for the baseline model). The equilibrium price of rental properties
is easily computed using q = r + P + H.
3. Given (r;w;t;b;0), solve the problem of agents. Specically, follow the steps below and
nd the optimal decision rules for consumption, c = gc(i;e;x), housing conditional on
owning, ho = go(i;e;x), housing conditional on renting, hr = gr(i;e;x), nancial asset
holdings, a = ga(i;e;x), total assets for the next period, x0 = gx(i;e;x), and hours worked,
` = g`(i;e;x).
36(a) Find the optimal decisions in the last period of life I. It is easier because age-I is the
last period of life and thus the maximand contains only the current utility for age I.
(b) Compute the value for age I, using the obtained optimal decisions.
(c) Given the value function for age I which is obtained in the last step, go back one
step and nd the optimal decision rules for age I   1. The value function in the next
period is interpolated using a spline approximation.
(d) Keep going back up to age 1.
4. Having obtained the optimal decision rules c = gc(i;e;x), ho = go(i;e;x), hr = gr(i;e;x),
a = ga(i;e;x), x0 = gx(i;e;x), and ` = g`(i;e;x), run a simulation with N agents (I use
N = 1;000;000 agents). Specically, follow the steps below:
(a) For each of N agents, draw the initial e from fp0
eg, using a random number generator.
Initial x is set at zero. Initial i is 1.
(b) For each of N agents, compute the optimal decisions (c;ho;hr;a;x0;`) using the opti-
mal decision rules. Notice that in order to compute the optimal tenure choice, values
conditional on owning and renting must be computed and compared for each agent.
Optimal decision rules are interpolated with piecewise linear functions.
(c) Once optimal decisions are obtained, update the individual state variables. e is up-
dated using the rst-order Markov process together with another draw from a random
number generator. x is updated using the optimal decision rule x0 = gx(i;e;x).
(d) Keep updating the individual state variables up to age I.
5. Using the simulation results, compute the aggregate variables. When aggregating individual
variables, normalize the measure of a single newborn as 1. Because of population growth
and mortality risk, the measure of a single age-2 agent is
1
1+
. Similarly, the measure of a




)i 1 (set 0 = 1), and so on.
6. Use the aggregate variables to construct new guesses (^ r; ^ w;^ t;^ b; ^ 0).
(a) The new prices, ^ r and ^ w, can be constructed using the prot-maximizing conditions
for the rm, and the aggregate capital stock and labor supply that are obtained by
aggregating individual agents' decision.
(b) The new amount of transfer ^ t can be constructed by computing the total amount of
accidental bequests (total amount of assets, taking into account interests and depre-
ciation, held by the agents that are not surviving), and dividing the total accidental
bequests by the number of living agents in the next period.
(c) The new social security benet ^ b can be constructed by computing the total social
security contribution and divide the total by the number of retirees.
37(d) In case 0 is used to guarantee revenue neutrality, the new ^ 0 can be obtained from the
government's balanced budget constraint. ^ 0 is chosen such that the balanced budget
is achieved. In the case of the baseline model, tax rates are all xed; 0 is always set
at 0:258 and there is no need for updating 0.
7. Compare the old and the new guess for prices. If the distance of the two is smaller than a
predetermined tolerance level, an equilibrium was found. Otherwise, update the guess and
go back to step 3.
8. Calibrating the model requires repeatedly solving the stationary equilibrium with a dierent
set of parameter values. If, in a stationary equilibrium with a set of parameters, all the
calibration targets are satised up to a predetermined tolerance level, the calibration is
done. Otherwise, change the parameters and solve the stationary equilibrium again.
A.4 Denition of the Welfare Measures
This appendix denes the welfare criteria for comparing two economies j = 0;1. Economy 0 is
the baseline economy and economy 1 is the counterfactual one. For example, economy 1 can be
a stationary equilibrium with a tax system featuring the optimal capital income tax rate. The
optimal combination of consumption of non-housing goods, housing services, and leisure of an
age-i agent in economy j, conditional on the initial e = e0 and the history of realization of labor






i(e0;e e)). Moreover, let e s denote the
history of realizations of mortality shocks. In particular, e si = 1 when the agent is alive in age-i,
and e si = 0 when the agent is dead in age-i.

























e is the probability with which e0 is drawn, e pe eje0 is the probability of a history e e
conditional on e0, e pe s is the unconditional probability of a history e s, 1 is the indicator function,
which takes the value of 1 if the statement attached to it is true, and 0 otherwise. In particular,
1e si=1 means that the agent is alive in age-i.
The welfare gain by moving from the economy 0 to the economy 1, measured by the uniform























Notice that the social welfare in economy 1 (left-hand side) is equated to the social welfare in
economy 0 where the consumption of non-housing goods in each age and node is increased by
the proportion  (right-hand side).
Now suppose the average consumption of non-housing goods, housing services, and leisure
increased by the proportion gc, gd and gm, respectively, by moving from economy 0 to economy 1.
38The welfare gain measured by a uniform percentage increase in non-housing consumption goods,
associated with the average increase in consumption of non-housing goods, housing services and














































The redistribution eect, d, which is the welfare gain measured by uniform percentage increase
in non-housing consumption goods, associated with changes in distribution of consumption of
non-housing goods, housing services and leisure, is dened as the residual, as follows:
d =    a (36)
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